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Greece and 
the United Nations
by
Dr. Van Coufoudakis
Assistant Professor 
Political Science Department 
Indiana University at Fort Wayne
The growing complexity and interdependence of the 
multistate system is reflected in the evolution and 
growth of international organizations with constant­
ly expanding political, economic, and social func­
tions. Although the international organization pro­
cess can be traced back to the nineteenth century,1 it 
was World War I and the advent of the League of 
Nations that ushered the era of international orga­
nization as we know it today.
Greece was one of the original signatories of both 
the League of Nations Covenant and the United Na­
tions Charter and has held continuous membership 
in these organizations. Greece also became a member 
of the specialized agencies of the United Nations 
as well as of other regional organizations, such as 
OECD, NATO and the Council of Europe, and finally 
an associate to the EEC.2
Given the extent of Greek participation in interna­
tional organizations, this paper will focus on the 
participation of Greece in political organizations only, 
with emphasis on the United Nations. References to 
such institutions as NATO and the Council of Eu­
rope will be made only in relation to the Greek par­
ticipation in the United Nations.
In the pages that follow I will examine the reasons 
for Greek participation in the United Nations, and 
the effects of such participation on Greek foreign 
policy and Greek domestic politics. I will also analyze 
the question of how Greece utilized the United 
Nations to protect and promote vital Greek foreign 
policy objectives in the post-World War II period. 
I will also show whether the realities of Greek parti­
cipation in the political activities of the United Na­
tions fulfilled the Greek expectations of the role that 
this organization would perform in the promotion 
and protection of Greek interests.
Greece: some general characteristics
Before proceeding with the analysis of the Greek 
participation in the United Nations, a brief listing 
of some general characteristics of Greece relevant 
to this discussion is in order.
(a) Since her establishment Greece has been under 
the influence, protection, as well as the intervention 
of the great powers in both her domestic and foreign 
affairs.
1. See the rise of the Public International Unions, the first 
permanent international organizations. Ex. ITU (1865), UPU 
(1874).
2. Greece, faced with expulsion, withdrew from the Council 
of Europe on December 12, 1969. Similarly, because of the 
1967 military takeover in Greece, the EEC Association was 
«frozen.» Since the restoration of democratic government 
in Greece late in July, 1974, the Greek Association to the EEC 
has been reactivated.
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(b) The strategic location, financial weakness, 
military vulnerability, the weak political institutions, 
and the territorial aspirations of Greece in the era 
of the Megali Idea, increased both the dependence 
on and interference by the great powers in Greek 
affairs.1
(c) Greece, by ethnic, cultural, political, economic, 
geographic, and psychological orientation and tra­
dition, belongs to the Western world. Yet because 
of its developing economy, Greece shares many of 
the problems, characteristics2 and economic aspira­
tions of other LDC’s.
(d) In contrast to the global interests and commit­
ments of the great powers, which have included and 
affected Greece since her independent existence, 
Greece by definition is a local power. The primary 
foreign policy concerns and objectives of the country 
have also been localized in the immediate geographi­
cal region of Greece. Even though such objectives were 
often pursued in international conferences or inter­
national organizations,3 this did not change the local 
character of these interests. It actually emphasized 
the limits of the capacity of Greece to bring about 
even limited systemic changes on her own, especially 
when such changes conflicted with the policies and 
interests of the great powers.
(e) Finally, there is also the question of «national 
pride,»4 which in the long history of Greece has pro­
vided a powerful psychological force that has allowed 
the Greek public and its officials to rationalize even 
the greatest setbacks without despair. But it has also 
made Greece look upon herself as the only law a- 
biding and moral member of the international commu­
nity. This has frequently been reflected in the def­
inition of the objectives of the nation’s foreign pol­
icy; the means utilized for its implementation, and 
the responses of the Greek government and the public 
when confronted with the opposition of the great 
powers in matters considered vital to Greek national 
interests.5 Some of these characteristics, as pre­
1. Primarily England and France prior to World War II 
and the United States since 1947.
2. Lack of significant natural resources; the attitudinal and 
institutional framework both public and private, that makes 
a high level of economic activity possible. See: Alec P. Alexan­
der, Greek Industrialists (Athens: Center of Planning and Eco­
nomic Research, 1964), pp. 77-130. Howard S. Ellis, Industrial 
Capital in Greek Development (Athens: Center of Planning 
and Economic Research, 1964), pp. 17-26, 106-198, 313-335. 
S. G. Triantis, Common Market and Economic Development 
(Athens: Center of Planning and Economic Research, 1965), pp. 
21-60, 227-232.
3. Ex. The Peace Conferences following both World Wars 
and the utilization of the United Nations in the Cyprus problem.
4. See also Stephanos Zotos, The Greeks: Dilemma between 
Past and Present (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), pp. 
3-21, 142-170, 181-185, 251-257.
5. See the Greek response to the 1923 Corfu incident with
Italy as against the 1925 Greco-Bulgarian incident. Similarly,
viously listed, have been important determinants 
of Greek international behavior and their significance 
will be shown further in the pages that follow.
motivations for Greek participation 
in international organizations
The fundamental reason for the participation of 
Greece in international political organizations must 
be found in the weakness and small state character­
istics of that country as previously outlined.
The experience of the interwar period only increased 
the concern of the Greek policy makers about the 
growing inequality between small and large states 
and the perceived threats from the policies adopted 
by the great powers in areas affecting Greek interests. 
Observing this common dilemma faced by many small 
states, Robert L. Rothstein concludes6 that there 
are two policy options available to them to compensate 
for their weakness. One is neutrality and non-align­
ment from great power conflicts. The other is de­
riving strength by association with other states, 
their alliances and international organizations.
Looking at the behavioral and policy manifesta­
tions of Greece since 1914,1 can conclude that Roth- 
stein’s latter option has been the only one that Greece 
has been able to follow with any degree of success. 
This point will be analyzed in the pages that follow. 
This is not to suggest that neutrality or non-alignment 
is incompatible with membership in international 
organizations. It is my contention though that in 
this time period, neutrality or non-alignment has been 
a virtually impossible policy for Greece to follow.
This is due to a number of reasons. Because of her 
strategic location, Greece has frequently found 
herself at the center of great power controversy 
to the point of being coerced to take sides in great 
power conflicts. This is best exemplified by the events 
surrounding Greece’s entry into the two World Wars. 
Similarly, the domestic controversy about the nature 
of the Greek political system during the interwar pe­
riod had attained by 1945 ideological dimensions char­
acteristic of the developing confrontation between 
the great powers. Thus even if Greece desired to show 
detachment from a major international crisis, this 
detachment was not recognized by the great powers. 
Furthermore, one must consider the nature of Greek 
politics; the fact that considerable foreign influence 
has been exercised in the domestic and foreign pol-
the question of external support to guerrillas during the late 
1940s as against the Cyprus rebellion 1954-1958. Finally, see 
the government’s retionalization of the withdrawal, or expul­
sion, of Greece from the Council of Europe as against the 
Council’s stand against Britain on the question of Cyprus.
6. Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia Univer­
sity Press, 1968), pp. 23-45.
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icies of the country, and finally the interest express­
ed by both the Greek political leaders and their 
public to be on the winning side of major internation­
al conflicts. The latter motivation has been inspired 
by both the expansionist objectives of the Megali 
Idea and the promises by the great powers themselves 
for such coveted territories.1 As a result, any form 
of neutrality or non-alignment has not been possible 
in recent Greek history. As for the pro-neutralist 
tendencies that developed between 1958 and 1965 
under the strains of the Cyprys problem, history will 
still have to show whether such tendencies would have 
been realized given the interplay of domestic and 
foreign political forces in Greece.2
In order to guarantee her security, Greece has 
therefore turned to the great powers, their alliances, 
and international organizations. My emphasis of 
course will be on the Greek participation in the 
United Nations.
Other authors3 stress a small state’s perception 
of its systemic role, rather than the need for external 
assistance for security purposes, as the distinct at­
titude and motivation for participating in interna­
tional organizations. Yet the Greek experience since 
1919 only partially conforms to the systemic role 
approach. Such a perception has only been secondary 
to the political and security motivations of Greek 
participation in international organizations and de­
rives from the country’s conception of its place in 
history as outlined earlier in this paper.
Through her membership in the institutionalized 
system of the League of Nations and the United Na­
tions, Greece expected to find an additional instru­
ment for the protection and promotion of Greek 
national and security interests. For Greece, these 
institutions potentially possessed the ability to exer­
cise political pressure and restraining power against 
the great powers through combined action with the 
other members of these oganizations. In this re­
spect the experience of the League of Nations was 
somewhat disappointing. Yet the realities of the pol­
itics of the interwar period only increased Greece’s 
interest to participate and strengthen the interna­
tional organization system.4 *
1. Such as on Asia Minor, the Dodecanese Islands, and 
(Typrus.
2. This article examines the period up to the restoration 
of democratic government in Greece in 1974. Thus the new 
prospects for Greek foreign policy will not be examined here.
3. Robert O. Keohane, «Lilliputians Dilemma: Small
States in International Politics,» International Organization, 
XXIII, No. 2 (Spring, 1969), pp. 296-297. The author states 
that «... a major function of international organizations— 
perceived by many small and middle powers—is to allow these 
states acting collectively to help shape developing international 
attitudes, dogmas, and codes of proper behavior.» p. 297.
4. S. Calogeropoulos-Stratis, La Grèce et les Nations Unies
(New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. 1957), pp. 5-37, 139.
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Participation in the political and security affairs 
of international organizations had additional ad­
vantages for Greece.6 These institutions represented 
the recognition, at least in theory, of the sovereign 
equality of their members, as well as the equality of 
their rights, inspite of the evident inequality of 
power, influence and authority among small states 
and the great powers. Finally, these institutions of­
fered Greece the opportunity to participate in the 
new system of institutionalized international rela­
tions and conference diplomacy after decades of open 
direction of the international system by the great 
powers. These characteristics of international or­
ganizations were particularly appealing to a country 
like Greece whose leaders and public are possessed 
by a strong sense of national pride deriving from the 
country’s historical achievements.
Participation in international organizations, how­
ever, was not the only method of protecting and 
promoting Greek interests. Since her independence, 
Greece has sought the friendship and assistance of 
such great powers as Britain, France, and the United 
States, as well as membership in bilateral and multi­
lateral alliances sponsored by these powers. Given 
the limited collective security potential of the United 
Nations, and its predecessor, Greece has had to 
rely on alternate arrangements to supplement her 
security. But even though the Cold War and the de­
velopments in military technology have largely under­
mined the limited collective security functions of 
the United Nations, the factors mentioned in the 
preceding pages as motivating the participation of 
Greece have retained their significance. Thus polit­
ical motivations have been the preponderant deter­
minants of Greek participation both at the League 
of Nations during the interwar period and the United 
Nations since 1945.
There is another factor that has affected Greek 
participation in international organizations, partic­
ularly since World War II. This has been the inter­
est shown by successive Greek governments in 
broadening the» political horizons of the Greek public. 
The 1922 Asiatic débâcle and the post-World War II 
political environment marked, at least for the in­
fluential political leadership, the end of the Megali 
Idea. Thus membership in the United Nations in 
particular served domestic political objectives as 
well. By attempting to reorient and transform the 
narrow nationalist outlook of the public into an 
international perspective, successive Greek govern­
ments hoped to release themselves from the political 
risks and bondage that the Megali Idea had imposed 
on their less fortunate predecessors throughout
5. The paper excludes questions of economic advantages 
derived from participation in international organizations.
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the first century of the country’s independent exis­
tence. 1
These then have been the reasons for the Greek 
participation in the political and security affairs of 
international organization. In the pages that follow 
I will examine various aspects of the Greek partici­
pation in the United Nations. Before proceeding 
though, a word of caution must be added as to the 
nature of some of my conclusions. Much of the dis­
cussion concerns the influence of governments on 
others and of international organizations on govern­
mental policy. I, therefore, must point out that these 
conclusions are presented without any claim to scien­
tific finality. Such methodological weakness is due 
to the difficulty of measurement and of proving cau­
sality in questions pertaining to influence. Thus the 
reader must approach these conclusions with this 
limitation in mind.
the United Nations and Greek 
diplomacy - impact and effects
Two major foreign policy problems, with clear do­
mestic implications and origins, confronted Greek 
diplomacy since 1945. These were the Greek Question, 
and the Cyprus Question.2 Greece, in both instances, 
resorted to the United Nations not so much because 
of her commitment to the institutionalized method 
of dispute settlement, but for other important poli­
tical reasons which will be briefly discussed in the 
next few pages.
Greece, with the urging United States and Britain, 
brought the Greek Question to the United Nations 
Security Council on December 12, 1946. Some of the 
reasons for this action are to be found in the inability 
of the postwar Greek governments to manage the 
Greek problem by political and military methods, 
the apparent involvement of outside powers on the 
side of the insurgents, and the earlier actions at the 
Security Council by Ukraine and the Soviet Union.3 
In this manner, Greece attempted to expose the actions 
of the Greek guerrillas and her northern Communist 
neighbors, and mobilize the support of other United 
Nations members on her behalf. Furthermore, with 
the identity of interests between the Greek and the 
American government, the organization’s legiti­
mizing power became the chief political instrument in
1. This fact was also acknowledged to the author by members 
of the Greek delegation to the United Nations in interviews 
conducted in 1973,
2. All references to the Cyprus Question pertain to the 
colonial phase of the dispute. Although this article makes 
occasional references to the post-1963 phase of the dispute, 
the reader is reminded of the fact that the main diplomatic 
effort at the United Nations in this period was that of the Re­
public of Cyprus.
3. January 21, 1946 and February 6, 1946 respectively.
the search for a decisive solution of the Greek Civil 
War. Thus while the military solution was pursued 
at the battlefield, the presence of the United Na­
tions encouraged the great powers to institution­
alize their conflict and limit the scope of the 
fighting within Greece.
The Cyprus Question shows that Greece resorted 
to the United Nations only because of her inability 
to bring about bilateral negotiations with Britain, 
leading to peaceful change of the status of the is­
land. The 1954 appeal to the General Assembly was 
originally intended to act as leverage toward such 
negotiations and was largerly motivated by pressures 
emanating from both Cyprus and from within Greece. 
With the persistent diplomatic inability of the Greek 
government to achieve its original objective, the con­
tinued appeals to the General Assembly were not 
only due to the pressures of domestic and Cypriot 
politics, but were also intended to act as preventive 
devices over British actions considered as totally 
against the Greek interests. It was clearly understood 
then in this case that the organization itself could 
neither alter the colonial status of the island, nor later 
on to revise the independence treaties. The Greek 
policy makers, though, expected the organization 
to supplement the otherwise limited Greek diplomat­
ic influence.4
In both instances, then, Greece, like any other 
state, selected the methods and institutions that at 
the time she felt would promote her interests the most. 
And consequently the presence of the United Nations 
did not preclude or exclude other simultaneous 
courses of action outside the organization.5
What other methods then were utilized by Greece 
in the Greek Question and the Cyprus Question? 
In the former case, because the Greek Civil War rep­
resented an early test of the effectiveness of the 
NLF idea, both sides chose to seek a decisive battle­
field solution to the problem. Thus the Security 
Council, the General Assembly and the subsidiary 
organs created to deal with the Greek Question be­
came supporting political actors in the Greco-Ameri- 
can cast that was engaged in the forcible resolution 
of the dispute. Also, the Security Council and the
4. For an extensive study of the 1954-1958 period see Stephen 
G.Xydis,Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation,1954-195S(Columbus: 
The Ohio State University Press, 1967). Also Stephen G. Xydis, 
«The UN General Assembly as an Instrument of Greek Poli­
cy: Cyprus, 1954-1958,» The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
XII (June, 1968), pp. 141-58. Also of particular relevance is the 
work by François Crouzet, Le Conflit de Chypre, 1946-1959 
(Brussels: Etablissements Emile Bruyant, 1973), and Thomas 
Ehrlich, Cyprus 1958-1967 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1974), pp. 7-35.
5. This was also emphatically affirmed in the interviews 
with members of the Greek delegation to the United Nations 
mentioned in footnote 1.
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General Assembly provided the stage upon which 
the great power actors and their proxies pursued the 
verbal portion of their confrontation.
In the Cyprus Question, Greece placed great em­
phasis in the diplomatic effort in the General Assem­
bly. The simultaneous use of other channels of action 
though was intended not only to supplement the lim­
ited influence of Greece in the Assembly, but also 
it came about because of the Assembly’s limited po­
tential to act in questions of peaceful change. Among 
these supplementary tactics, Greece utilized appeals 
to the Council of Europe in an effort to pressure 
further the British government over its policies on 
Cyprus and in turn to strengthen the Greek case in the 
General Assembly. The use of force was also exten­
sively employed on Cyprus under the sanction, if not 
also the aid of the Greek government, not only to 
pressure the British to concede to the unionist de­
mands, but also to keep the Cyprus Question under 
consideration in the Assembly. In pursuing these 
supplementary channels of action, successive Greek 
governments discovered that the successful use of 
force by an independent underground organization, 
geographically distant and supported by the local 
population, often complicated and even threatened 
the task of the Greek diplomats at the United Na­
tions.1
Did the involvement of international organizations 
in these two major foreign policy problems of Greece 
increase or decrease the influence of Greek govern­
ments in their handling of these problems? In both 
instances the involvement of the United Nations in­
creased the diplomatic options available to Greece 
and provided an important supplement to Greek 
diplomacy. The United Nations provided the chan­
nels through which the issues of each dispute could be 
publicized and exposed. The organization was also 
used for bringing pressure to bear against actions 
contemplated or actually carried cut by Greece’s 
adversaries. These included actions of states2 as well 
as of such an institution as NATO in the Cyprus Ques­
tion. NATO’s hostile attitude toward the Cyprus 
Question and its attempts to intervene in the dispute 
showed not only that organizations to which a state 
belongs often have divergent political perspectives, 
but that such organizations can often be rivals and 
that they can be used to check one another.
Furthermore, because of the unusual degree of 
coincidence among Greek and American interests
1. General Grivas in his memoirs shows several instances 
of disagreements and lack of coordination between Athens and 
Nicosia. Charles Foley (ed.), The Memoirs of General Grivas 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965). See also François 
Crouzet, op. cit.
2. For example during the 13th session of the Assembly
against the implementation of the second MacMillan Plan.
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and the influence of the United States in the United 
Nations, Greece was able to benefit from the organi­
zation’s legitimization capacity in the Greek Ques­
tion. As a result, the legitimization politics of the 
organization were marshalled by Greece and the 
United States in the political campaign against the 
guerrillas, as well as in the nation-building effort 
within Greece.
In the Cyprus Question the objectives Greece was 
seeking by her resort to the United Nations were 
not fully achieved.3 Yet it is my position that with 
the limited political influence of Greece and the in­
ternational politics of the period,4 she would have 
been unable to achieve as much without the United 
Nations. The reason for this conclusion lies in the 
fact that Greek diplomacy would have been deprived 
of the significant supplementary channels of action 
that the organization provided it within this instance.
So far the discussion has centered on the advan­
tages of Greek participation in the United Nations. 
Did Greece, though, also face any restraints that 
would not have been present in the absence of such 
organizations? The restraining effect of the United 
Nations involvement in the Greek Question was 
manifested in a variety of ways, especially as the 
organization came to play such a significant political 
role in the resolution of the Greek Civil War. One
3. For a controversial and significant critique of Greek di­
plomacy and the objectives sought by Greece in the Cyprus 
Question, see Pantazis Terlexis, Diplomatia kai Politike tou 
Kypriakou: Anatomia Enos Lathous (Athens: Rappas, 1971). 
Greece moved toward the compromises in Zurich and London 
under the inability to achieve her goals at the United Nations; 
the threat of the implementation of the second MacMillan Plan; 
and the effect of the Cyprus Question on the outcome of the 
1958 Greek parliamentary elections. The other parties to the 
dispute were also forced to modify their goals as well. Britain’s 
changing strategic needs in the area following the 1956 Suez 
experience and EOKA’s struggle, along with the domestic 
and international pressures created by the Cyprus Question, 
contributed to the decision to accept the Greco-Turkish agree­
ment which provided for Britain’s security needs. Turkey in 
turn having started from maximum demands centering around 
the cession of Cyprus to Turkey, and later the partition of the 
island, achieved more than it ever expected in terms of protec­
tions to the Turkish Cypriot minority. Factors contributing 
to the Turkish willingness to negotiate were the Greek willing­
ness to compromise; the economic and political problems 
faced at home by Menderes; the threats to Turkish security 
created by the instability in the Middle East following the 
1958 Iraqi coup. All parties were also affected by their fear 
of communism and the deterioration of NATO’s S. E. flank. 
The official Greek position during these negotiations is given 
by Stephen G. Xydis in his latest book Cyprus-Reluctant 
Republic (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1973). Professor 
Xydis had access to the Karamanlis and Avetoff archives.
4. The limited size of the anti-colonial bloc prior to 1960; 
the concern of the United States about the Middle East and 
the cohesion of NATO in the aftermath of Suez; and the 
opposition of the United States to the continuous Greek ap­
peals to the United Nations over Cyprus.
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such manifestation was seen in the insistence of the 
United States and Britain on maintaining in Greece 
a semblance of Parliamentary politics as well as 
governments representative of the non-Communist 
Greek public. Furhermore, the constant pressure 
by the Soviet Union on the question of the death 
sentences imposed by Greek tribunals did eventually 
contribute to the relaxation of such policies at the 
urging also of the United States and other members 
of the Western coalib'on. Finally, the involvement 
of the United Nations also contributed to the in­
stitutionalization of the dispute and toward the 
limiting of the hostilities in Greece only.
Similarly, in the Cyprus Question, Greece was forced 
to justify her claims and actions over Cyprus in 
the General Assembly. This was particularly ev­
ident in the government’s justification of the use of 
violence by EOKA and the manner in which the Greek 
government supported EOKA’s activities. In the post­
independence portion of the Cyprus Question, 
the involvement of the United Nations did not 
preclude the independent support of the Cypriot 
government by the Greek Army. Once more, though, 
the pattern of support was affected by the involve­
ment of the Security Council and UNFICYP of the 
island. Furthermore, because so much emphasis 
was placed on the diplomatic effort through the United 
Nations, Greece had to modify considerably her 
goals during the colonial phase of the Cyprus Question 
and accept Britain’s negotiation proposals even if 
in essence such negotiations often undermined the 
original Greek goals.
Ultimately, one point remains clear. Although 
Greek diplomacy found a valuable supplement 
through the United Nations, Greek participation 
cannot be examined in isolation from the attitudes, 
the actions, and the relations prevailing at a specific 
time among the influential great powers as well as 
the great powers and Greece. This was best exempli­
fied by the Greek Question. Yet the Cyprus Question 
in some ways displays more accurately the limited 
influence of Greece in the context of great power 
and international organization politics. Despite 
the apparent inability of Greece to promote her 
primary objectives against the combined opposition 
of the Western great powers, the Greek government, 
by taking its case to the General Assembly, show­
ed considerable appreciation of the organization’s 
political potential. The Greek government was able 
to put together and maintain a functioning political 
coalition in the General Assembly. Capitalizing on 
the growing membership of the organization and 
the evolving multipolarity in the international 
system, Greece, inspite of her pro-Western com­
mitments, was able to prevent the application of 
solutions favored by her great power protectors,
undermine great power policies and even defy their 
political advice.
One more point must be mentioned on the effect 
of the United Nations on Greek foreign policy. 
Participation in international organization political 
activities, other than those mentioned previously, 
broadened the range and scope of Greek interests 
and obligations. Greece has been defined in the 
introductory section of this paper as a small state 
With local or regional interests. Yet Greece had also 
discovered that during the period of the Cold War, 
by belonging to an international organization which 
was part of the anti-Communist coalition, additional 
commitments were required on her than just votes 
on Cold War issues. Thus participating in the Korean 
War under the United Nations command involved 
Greece in an area far beyond the usual scope of her 
interests, even if in principle, Greece as a victim 
of Communist activity, was quite sympathetic to the 
plight of Korea. Similar is also the case of the Greek 
participation in the mandatory sanctions against 
Southern Rhodesia.1
Participation in the United Nations, though, has 
had domestic political implications in Greece. This 
will be analyzed in the next section of this paper.
Greek domestic politics and the United Nations
Two basic questions arise at this point. One is 
What effect did Greek domestic politics have on the 
actions of the various Greek governments at the U- 
nited Nations. The other question is whether the in­
volvement of the organization in the issues I have dis­
cussed complicated the relations of the various 
Greek governments With their public.
The roots of the Greek Question were to be found 
in the domestic politics of Greece, which by 1946 
had obtained ideological dimensions characteristic of 
the division between the great powers. The various 
post-World War Π Greek governments became in­
creasingly dependent on Britain and the United 
States for political, economic, military and diplomatic 
support. The reasons for this dependence were to be 
found not only in the unrepresentative character 
of these governments, but also in their inability to 
manage the domestic problems of Greece and pri­
marily of the Civil War. This contributed to the low 
profile of Greece during the discussion at the Se­
curity Council of the Ukrainian and Soviet complaints. 
It also contributed to the emphasis of the United 
States on maintaining a semblance of representative
1. In pursuance of the various Security Council resolutions 
on Southern Rhodesia, Greece has introduced Laws 95/1967 
and 540 /1968 by which all economic transactions with Rhodesia 
are forbidden along with the transportation of Rhodesian com­
modities by ships under Greek flag and aircraft.
297
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 02:54:10 |
Έπιθεώρησις Κοινωνικών ’Ερευνών
government in Greece through elections and coalitions 
of non-Communist parties.
The involvement of the United Nations in the var­
ious phases of the Greek Question appears to have 
strengthened the relations of the various Greek gov­
ernments with the non-Communist public. By publi­
cizing the actions of the Security Council and the 
General Assembly, and the findings of their subsidi­
ary organs, the various Greek governments found an 
important supplement in their nation building effort. 
The only instance where the involvement of the United 
Nations could have complicated the relations of the 
Greek government with its public was in the Concil­
iation Commission’s suggestion for normalization 
of Greco-Albanian relations. The Greek govern­
ment avoided taking the initiatives that Would have 
allowed for such normalization as they entailed the 
rejection of the long-standing Greek territorial claims 
against Albania. Otherwise, in the Greek Question 
Greek governments under the influence of the United 
States found an invaluable political instrument in 
the United Nations in pursuing their domestic as 
well as foreign policy.
In analyzing the Cyprus Question we must keep in 
mind the political environment in Greece in the post- 
1954 period. In contrast to the preceding case, this 
Was a period of relative governmental and political 
stability. With growing evidence of economic recovery 
from the ravages of World War II and the Civil War, 
and the slow decline in the intensity of the Cold War, 
the numerous personality-oriented political parties, 
as well as the public, began focusing their attention 
on foreign policy matters more extensively than in the 
period of the Civil War.
The Papagos government received broad support 
in its decision to internationalize the Cyprus Ques­
tion. The nationalism of the Greek public, the Greek 
Cypriot ability to affect Greek domestic politics, and 
Britain’s unwillingness to discuss the Cyprus Question 
with Greece contributed to the government’s decision 
to take its case to the United Nations.1 Because of 
these reasons it is actually doubtful whether any 
Greek government could have avoided for long the 
Cyprus Question. The apparent inability of both the 
Papagos and the Karamanlis governments to promote 
the Greek objectives through the General Assem­
bly and the opposition to the Greek claims by the 
Western great powers and other NATO countries, 
led to the politicization of the Cyprus Question in 
Greece. As a result, not only the various Greek gov­
ernments were forced to continue their appeals to
1. For the Greek decision to go to the United Nations among
various recent studies, see: François Crouzet, op. cit., Pantazis
Terlexis, op. cit., and Stephen G. Xydis, Cyprus: Conflict and
Conciliation, 1954-1958.
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the General Assembly, but Karamanlis was also 
confronted by 1958 with a total challenge of the overall 
foreign policy orientation of Greece by the opposi­
tion parties and the majority of the public. These 
factors were in turn manifested in the 1958 elections 
and contributed to the government’s determination 
to bring an end to the Cyprus Question.2
Similarly, the eruption of the post-independence 
crisis on Cyprus in the closing days of 1963, which 
occurred at a time when Greece was undergoing ma­
jor domestic political changes, could not allow any of 
the Greek political parties to overlook the need for 
revisions to the Cyprus independence Treaties. Thus 
the Greek government’s actions both on Cyprus and 
at the United Nations were largely the result of domes­
tic political considerations as well as of the ability 
of the Cypriots to affect Greek politics.
In contrast to the Greek Question then, as the 
preceding paragraphs have shown, the involvement 
of the United Nations in the Cyprus Question compli­
cated the relations of the various Greek governments 
With their own public. Thus the Cyprus Question be­
came an issue of partisan debate; the foreign policy 
orientation of Greece Was challenged by the public; 
faith in Greece’s alliances was undermined;3 and the 
public expressed a great deal of bitterness about the 
ability of the great powers to impose their political 
views on the «moral» objectives of the Charter.4 
The difficulties Greece encountered at the United 
Nations in promoting the Cyprus Question and the 
ensuing politicization of the problem in Greece ref­
lects another aspect of Greek politics. The frequent 
presentation of international organization affairs 
in the perspective of the ideals of the Charter,5 
rather than of the dynamics of international politics, 
limited the range of public understanding as to why 
the governmentwas unable to promote its objectives in 
the organization. Furthermore, in Greece the Cyprus 
Question had obtained the tone of a moral crusade
2. For relevant statistics and political analysis, see Theodore 
A. Couloumbis, Greek Political Reactions to American and 
NATO Influences (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
3. See the behavior of the other NATO members in the 
1954-1958 period. Also, The Cyprus Question along with the 
Russo-Yugoslav rapprochement of 1955 undermined the Bal­
kan Pact.
4. Typical is the reaction in Demetrios S. Bezanes, To Ky- 
priakon Zetema (Athens: Ethnikistikos Syndesmos, 1959), 
pp. 14-17. The author protests in the characteristic manner of 
the period not only the «inability» and the «impotence» of the 
United Nations to assist in the resolution of the Cyprus Ques­
tion, but also the overshadowing of the Charter’s provisions 
by the national interests of the various states. The author sug­
gests then that there is a discrepancy between the actions 
of the General Assembly and the Charter’s provisions on 
self-determination.
5. Characteristic are the views included in Alexes Adonidos 
Kyrou, Hellenike Exoterike Politike (Athens: E. Zombolas 
Publishers, 1955), pp. 149-157.
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for self-determination, an objective also stated in the 
Charter and affirmed in the Assembly’s earlier res­
olutions.1 In this respect, even the experience of the 
Greek Question, where the political influence of the 
organization was thrown into the battle in support of 
Greece, had a negative effect on the public’s expecta­
tions for the role of the organization in the Cyprus 
Question. Thus the failure to promote the original 
Greek objectives and gain recognition of the right 
of the Cypriots to self-determination was due either 
to the government’s subservience to the Western great 
powers, or to the ability of these states to superim­
pose their values over those of the United Nations.
It was stated earlier in this paper that another 
motivation for Greek participation in international 
organizations was the need to direct the public’s 
attention away from the narrow nationalism of the 
Megali Idea and thus liberate the government from 
the burdens and restrictions it imposed. It is some­
what ironic that in the Cyprus Question successive 
Greek governments found that the pre-World War 
II burdens of the Megali Idea had only been replaced 
by new political pressures at home created by the 
frustrations of international organization politics.
Undoubtedly in Greece, much like in other states, 
the degree of frustration with international organiza­
tion politics depends on the illusions held by the pub­
lic as to what can be achieved through international 
organizations in the present state of international 
politics. The situation in Greece is further compli­
cated2 by the absence of informed opinion elites on 
the subject, organizations promoting an understand­
ing of such institutions, and any significant theoreti­
cal treatises in Greek by Greek writers3 on inter­
national organizations. Thus the Greek public, even 
today, remains unaware of international organization 
activities, politics, and the Greek participation in 
such organizations.4 This is particularly disconcert­
ing because as the Cyprus Question has shown in 
vital questions of policy, there is a close interplay 
of domestic and international politics. And as Greece
1. United Nations Charter, Articles 1 (2); 2 (4); 55; and reso­
lutions 637 (VII), 742 (Vili).
2. This was also acknowledged in my interviews with mem­
bers of the Greek delegation to the United Nations in 1973.
3. Perhaps the only «realistic» interpretation of an interna­
tional organization charter is that of Georgios X. Christopou- 
los, Paratereseis epi tou Symphonou tes Koinonias ton Ethnon 
(Athens: A. Kleisiounis, 1937).
4. Members of the Greek delegation to the United Nations 
confirm this. In the particular case of the Council of Europe, 
it was also acknowledgd that the Greek public was hardly aware 
of its existence. The discussion allowed by the junta in Greece
on the «withdrawal» or «expulsion» of Greece from the 
Council, produced no greater understanding of that institution
given that the government justified its action on the grounds
of «philotimo» and nationalism.
was and remains a highly partisan state, this condi­
tion should be of major concern to the government.
other indicators of Greek participation 
in the United Nations
Three additional indicators will be utilized in this 
section to supplement the discussion of Greek partic­
ipation at the United Nations; (a) the leadership 
role of Greece at the United Nations; (b) the seats 
occupied by Greece in important United Nations polit­
ical organs; and (c) financial support of Greece for 
the United Nations.
After 30 years of continued membership at the 
United Nations, it can safely be said that Greece 
has failed to develop an independent and dynamic 
role in the organization. There are a number of 
reasons for the innocuous position of Greece in the 
United Nations. In the early days of the organization, 
the impact of Cold War politics, the total dependence 
of Greece on the United States, and the preoccupa­
tion with the domestic political and economical prob­
lems, did not allow Greece to develop an independent 
position at the United Nations. In the post-1954 pe­
riod, even though Greece acted independently of the 
Western great powers in the Cyprus Question, this 
did not provide the basis for the creation of an inde­
pendent role for Greece in the Assembly. The bur­
dens of the Cyprus problem and, after 1965, the do­
mestic political complications inhibited Greece from 
developing such an activist leadership role in the 
Assembly. For that matter, I have not yet seen any 
evidence that Greek diplomats ever had as one of 
their priorities the development of such a role for 
Greece. This also partially explains why, in the mo­
tivations for Greek participation in international 
organizations, the «systemic role» perception5 has 
never figured seriously in the minds of Greek policy 
makers.
There is also another reason that must be taken 
into account and this is that Greece occupies a rather 
uncertain position in the «bloc» and «group» structure 
of the United Nations.6 Western, but yet on the pe­
riphery of the Western group, Greece, since 1954 and 
the Cyprus Question, has often deviated from the rest 
of the group in questions of colonialism and economic 
and social matters.7 At the same time, although, 
Greece, on a number of occasions, votes along with
5. See section on motivations for Greek participation in inter­
national organizations and the related comments by Robert
O. Keohane.
6. See Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Na­
tions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 5-7, 31- 
33, 38-41, 44-45, 98-99, 124.
7. In other Western organizations Greece also deviates from 
the other members of the group, Ex. in the OECD along with
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members of non-aligned groups or other LDC’s, these 
alliances are temporary and are generally related to 
trade-offs over Cyprus1 or matters of common con­
cern with other LDC’s in the area of trade and devel­
opment. In turn, Third World states are aware of these 
reasons2 and remain suspicious of Greece given her 
commitments to the Westwhether by political tradition 
or alliances. Furthermore, Greece herself feels uncer­
tain of her relationship with the Third World states. 
As previously mentioned, Greece shares some com­
mon positions on a number of economic and political 
issues with states of the Third World, but she has nei­
ther the political background, the foreign policy orien­
tation nor the political aspirations of the new members 
of the United Nations.3 Undoubtedly, Greece is an 
indirect beneficiary of the lessening of great power 
influence in the affairs of the United Nations that 
came about after 1960 because of the entry of the new 
states in the organization. But Greece, much like other 
Western powers, has expressed concern for the 
effectiveness of the organization because of the incon­
sistency of the numerical strength and the political 
influence of the new members. Thus Greece today 
finds herself in the position of supporting the United 
Nations and its activities, but yet not being able or 
willing to develop a dynamic and independent role in 
the organization.4
As a corollary to the role of Greece at the United 
Nations, one can examine the seats occupied by
Sweden and the Council of Europe prior to 1969; in NATO 
(prior to 1967) along with Norway and Denmark and France. 
See Thomas Hovet, Jr., op. cit., pp. 98-99.
1. Thus Greece supports the Afro-Asians on anti-colonial, 
apartheid, and Arab-Israeli issues. In the latter case the asso­
ciation with the Arabs has by tradition been more permanent.
2. In a lengthy talk with Greek officials over Cyprus, Prime 
Minister Nehru of India was reported to have said that once 
the Cyprus matter was settled Greece would once more become 
a «Western subject... without will or opinion of her own.» 
Gregorios Kasimates, He Hellas kai ho Kosmos (Athens: 
Serbinis Printers, 1961), p. 44.
3. See David A. Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 
1960-1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
4. This «split» personality of Greece at the UN was well 
manifested in the post-1964 phase of the Cyprus problem. The 
independent government of Cyprus did the lobbying among 
states of the Third World. The Greek role was supportive 
and provided a «western» link to Cypriot diplomats. See Robert 
O. Keohane, «The Study of Political Influence in the General 
Assembly,» International Organization, Spring 1967 (Voi. 
21, No. 2), pp. 221-237.
As for the last major outstanding Cold War question at the 
United Nations, that of Chinese representation, Greece almost 
to the end supported the American position. Finally, recogni­
zing the changing climate at the United Nations, if not also 
the mood of the United States, Greece by 1969, shifted to 
abstention on the issue. In 1971 Greece voted in favor of the 22 
power draft that required a 2/3 vote to deprive Taiwan of its 
credentials (Cyprus and Turkey abstained) and abstained on 
the 23 power draft expelling Taiwan and giving representation 
to Peking only.
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Greece in important political organs of the organi­
zation. Given the peculiar position of Greece in the 
«group» structure, the pattern of geographical re­
presentation, the impact of the Cyprus problem in 
its relation with the United States, and the diplomatic 
isolation of the 1967-1974 period, Greece has only 
served one term in the Security Council and that 
in the seat allocated to Eastern Europe in 1952-53.5
The final indicator of Greek participation that will 
be analyzed is the financial support of Greece for the 
United Nations. This is one of many ways of indi­
cating support for the organization and its activities,6 
and has been selected because it shows what support 
a state intends to provide the United Nations, the 
impact that state has on the organization, and the 
Willingness to bear the burdens of the organization.7 8
The latter is significant particularly for a developing 
state like Greece. The figures below are average an­
nual payments to the United Nations and its related 
agencies and include assessed as well as voluntary 
payments actually made rather than just assessments 
and pledges. Of course, the average percent of in­
crease in the 1960’s was high in most cases because 
of the expansion of United Nations programs. What 
is important, though, is the increase in contributions 
over specific periods of time, and also the comparison 
with other contributions over the same time period.
Greece: Mean Annual Contributions in 000’s*
1946-50 1951-55 1956-59 1960-64 1965-69
149 235[+58%] 284[ + 21%] 980[245%] 2538[+159%]
Mean increase 1946-1969:+ 121%
The mean increase for Greece for the period of 1946- 
69 is only surpassed by Sweden (+ 126%), Finland 
(+ 169%), Austria (+ 179%), Japan (+ 126%) and is 
followed by Ireland (+121%) and Cyprus (+120%). 
Although some African and some Communist bloc
states show significant if not greater increases, 
the amounts involved are minimal and are not there­
fore accurate indicators. In contrast to these figures
5. For that matter, even in the economic and social organs 
of the United Nations, Greece has occupied proportionately 
fewer and less influential positions compared to her neighbors, 
Yugoslavia and Turkey.
6. See John F. Clark, Michael K. O’Leary and Eugene 
R. Wittkopf, «National Attributes Associated with Dimensions 
of Support for the United Nations,» International Organiza­
tion, Winter 1971 (Voi. 25, No. 1), pp. 1-25.
Other methods include General Assembly voting indices 
and Delegation size indices.
7. See the recent study by E. T. Rowe, «Financial Support 
for the United Nations: The Evolution of MemberContributions 
1946-1969,» International Organization, Autumn 1972 (Voi. 
26, No. 4), pp. 619-658.
8. E.T. Rowe, op. cit., p. 623.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 02:54:10 |
Greece and the United Nations
there are also: the USSR (+106%); the US (+ 35%); 
the UK (+27 %); France ( + 33%); Yugoslavia 
(+ 56%) and Turkey (+39%). It is even more accu­
rate to examine the question of the burden of con­
tributions in terms of actual and adjusted GNP.1
1946- 1951- 1956-59 1960-64 1965-
Annual 50 55 69
Contributions % Percen-% PR % PR % PR % PR 
tile 
Rank
Greece GNP .010 11 .011 7 .010 9 .022 47 .037 66
Adj. GNP .017 9 .017 5 .014 9 .029 31 .041 59
US GNP .032 77 .025 71 .022 66 .035 73 0.29 56
Adj. GNP .032 61 .025 29 .022 32 .035 52 0.29 32
USSR GNP .033 1 .006 1 .011 15 .014 14 .017 21
Adj. GNP .004 1 .008 1 .012 5 .015 5 .017 7
In general, the high support record on the basis 
of contributions made by Greece, especially in the 
1960’s, is indicative of a strong interest in the orga­
nization and its activities.2 But a good part of this 
support is due to the United Nations peacekeeping 
on Cyprus which has served Greek objectives on the 
island since 1964. Toward UNFICYP, specifically, 
during the period of March 27, 1964, to December 
15, 1972, Greece has contributed nearly $ 11 million. 
This is the fourth largest contribution after the United 
States ($ 52 million), Britain ($ 30 million) and the 
Federal Republic of Germany ($ 11.5 million). In 
contrast, for the same period, Turkey had contributed 
$ 1.8 million for the Cyprus operation.3
It will remain to be seen in the future whether 
Greece, following a settlement of the Cyprus Ques­
tion, will continue such high levels of financial sup­
port for the organization. It is my estimation, though, 
that this will not be the case and that Greece will 
return to lower levels of financial support as long as 
no other issue at the United Nations obtains the level 
of priority that Cyprus had had for Greek diplo­
macy since 1964.
1. Ibid., pp. 634-635.
2. For Greece, like most other countries, the United Na­
tions contributions still amount to a fraction of the GNP and a 
fraction of the military budget. See E.T. Rowe, op. cit., pp. 
650-654.
3. See letter and statement by Secretary-General Waldheim 
distributed to all UN delegations on January 30, 1973.
prospects
The preceding pages have outlined various carac- 
teristics of Greece, and how such characteristics 
affected Greek participation in the United Nations. 
Two key caseswere also examined involving the United 
Nations and Greece. In general, it must be said that the 
reasons for which Greece joined the United Nations 
are still valid today, and are likely to remain so with 
the evolution of the international system toward 
multipolarity. For the reasons outlined earlier, the 
possibilities of a dynamic leadership role for Greece 
at the United Nations do not exist, unless a dramatic 
realignment of Greek foreign policy takes place in 
Athens. Yet the prospects for continued Greek 
participation at the United Nations are good, espe­
cially as the organization continues to deal with 
issues of relevance to Greece.
The 1969 withdrawal of Greece from the Council 
of Europe also raised questions as to the prospects 
of continued Greek membership at the United Na­
tions. Such speculation though lacked seriousness. 
Even if the political conditions of the 1967-1974 period 
had persisted in Greece, the possibility of a similar 
forced withdrawal (or expulsion) on questions of 
violations of human rights would have been nil. This 
would be due to the different procedures, political 
climate and composition of the United Nations, and 
the fact that the Greek case would have never 
aroused in the Assembly a coalition such as the one 
witnessed in the same time period on the question of 
apartheid and the Arab-Istaeli conflict.
Since the return to political normalcy in Greece 
late in the summer of 1974 there is evidence indicating 
greater activism by Greece in international organiza­
tions. Such efforts seem to be directed primarily to­
ward European regional organizations rather than 
the United Nations. This is not unusual though and 
is likely to remain so in the near future given the Greek 
economic needs, the new political image of Greece 
in the aftermath of the junta, and the «new look» in 
Greek foreign policy as it seeks to define its place 
among the other Western countries and break away 
from the influence of the United States for the first 
time since 1945.
One final comment is also in order. Despite the 
revival of interest in modern Greek politics and for­
eign policy over the past decade, the field of Greek 
participation in international political, economic and 
social organizations, remains relatively untouched. 
This may then be the time of reviving this relatively 
unknown side of Greek foreign policy.
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